According to Kelley, the process of making person, stimulus, and circumstance attributions is based on the three informational criteria of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness. Two studies were conducted to assess how the relative accessibility of these three process-relevant criteria affected the time required to make the three attributions. Accessibility was manipulated in both studies by giving subjects a recall test (prime) for at least one of the three informational criteria. Subjects in both studies observed a scenario, after which they were primed for one or more of the three criteria and were then asked to scale one of the three attributions. In Experiment 1 (TV = 93), participants were primed for either all three process-relevant criteria or three pieces of attributionally irrelevant information. Thirty seconds after the accessibility manipulation, subjects scaled a person, stimulus, or circumstance attribution. Priming the process-relevant information decreased subsequent attribution decision time relative to the control group. In Experiment 2 (N = 137) participants were primed for consensus, distinctiveness, or consistency, after which they scaled one of the three attributions. As expected, attribution decision times were lower when all three factors were primed (Experiment 1) than when only one of the three factors was primed (Experiment 2). In addition, stimulus and person attributions were made fastest when consensus and distinctiveness, respectively, were primed. Finally, priming cognitive access to a single factor made that factor dominate the scaled attributions. These results lend support to Kelley's model, in that the priming of information presumably relevant to the attribution process reduced the time observers required to make attribution decisions. Kelley (1967) proposed that causal attri-stimulus toward which the action is directed butions for a given behavioral event are a (in the case in which all three factors are function of three factors: (a) high versus low high); (b) covarying with the person whose consensus (i.e., most vs. few people would action is directed toward the stimulus (in the respond as the actor responded to the stimu-case in which consistency is high, but conlus); (b) high versus low consistency (i.e., sensus and distinctiveness are low); (c) cothe actor would generally vs. seldom respond varying with the circumstances at the time of in this manner across time/modalities); and the event (in the case in which consensus and (c) high versus low distinctiveness (i.e., the consistency are low but distinctiveness is actor would respond similarly vs. dissimilarly high); or (d) covarying with more than one to different stimuli). These three factors pro-cause (e.g., high consensus and consistency, vide a schematic representation as to whether but low distinctiveness suggests both person the behavioral event is (a) covarying with the and stimulus as causes). Kelley's (1967 Kelley's ( , 1973 analysis of the atThe authors would like to thank Michael E. Enzle tribution process suggests that enhancing and Brendan G. Rule for comments on an earlier access to consensus, consistency, and distinc-
that people can use consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information when explicitly provided, but that use of this information is cumbersome, nonschematized, and detracts from a preferred simpler manner of making attributions. This viewpoint suggests that increasing cognitive access to consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness would impede rather than facilitate the time required to make attribution decisions.
In the current studies, we tested hypotheses about the mediational status of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness by manipulating the cognitive accessibility of these factors and measuring the decision time involved in subsequent attributions. Accessibility refers to the ease with which the decision-relevant information can be retrieved (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966) . Increasing the accessibility of process-relevant information prior to the time a process-related decision is requested serves to facilitate retrieval at the time that the decision is requested, thereby reducing decision time. The extent to which consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness are considered to be process-relevant information could be tested, therefore, by increasing cognitive accessibility to that information and observing subsequent attribution decision times. Our first study was designed to assess whether increasing cognitive accessibility to Kelley's attribution criteria results in faster attribution decision times or whether it impedes the process, relative to a control group.
Precedence for the above prediction is found in the literature concerned with how the earlier processing of material related or unrelated to the processing of a subsequent response affects later response latencies (cf. Seller, 1971; Neely, 1977; Posner & Klein, 1973; Posner & Mitchell, 1967; Posner & Snyder, 1975) . Research on priming has found that prior processing of stimuli related to the response facilitates faster decision times more than does prior processing of response-unrelated stimuli (cf. Posner & Snyder, 197S) . The facilitation effect presumably occurs because prior processing of responserelated stimuli (a) culminates in a partial representation of relevant stimulus aspects, thereby facilitating a more complete representation at the time of the response and (b) becomes represented in a shorter-term memory store, thereby eliminating the further step of accessing relevant information from long-term memory.
In addition to our expectations regarding response latencies, we hypothesized that scaled attributions might reflect on the issues mentioned earlier. Specifically, Kelley's (1967) analysis suggests that while increasing accessibility to all three information factors should facilitate attribution decision time, it should not affect the observers' scaled attributions. However, if observers prefer to rely on information other than consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness, then increasing accessibility to these three factors might alter the scaled attributions of the attributors relative to a control group.
Our operationalization of accessibility was achieved through the use of a priming manipulation that required observers of a scenario to recall information that was either directly related to consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness or unrelated to these three factors. Following the priming manipulation, observers were asked to scale a person, stimulus, or circumstance attribution. Subjects were not informed of what questions would be presented to them nor of the fact that we were recording the latencies of their attribution decisions.
Experiment 1

Method
Subjects and Design
Ninety-three persons (52 females, 41 males) participated in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (priming) X 3 (type of attribution) factorial design. Participants were primed for their memory of either the attribution-relevant information (i.e., consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness) or the attribution-irrelevant information as described in the Scenario section. The type of attribution factor refers to the subsequent attribution decision to be scaled by the subject (either person, circumstance, or stimulus).
Apparatus
Subjects observed a videotaped scenario over a 23 cm video monitor and monitored the audio portion with headphone sets. Subjects then observed four videotaped questions and responded to the questions by pressing one of seven keys on a 15 cm X 23 cm panel. The presentation of each question automatically activated a digital clock in the experimenter's room. Depressing any of the seven keys automatically stopped the digital clock and the specific key that was pressed was indicated on a light panel. Four experimental stations, each with a TV monitor, headphone set, and seven-key response panel, were operated simultaneously from the experimenter's room using a single videotape recorder.
Scenario
The scenario consisted of a videotaped interview between an employee and his supervisor. The interview lasted approximately 3 minutes and concerned an incident in which the employee (on whom the camera was focused throughout) turned down an assistant (Bob Kryss) for promotion. Several facts (including high consensus, low distinctiveness, and high consistency) developed during the interview in the following order: (a) the employee had worked for the company for about 2 years; (b) other members of the promotion committee also independently decided to turn Kryss down for promotion (high consensus) ; (c) the target employee had also turned down all of his assistants for promotion (low distinctiveness); (d) the employee had evaluated Kryss for promotion on other occasions and, in each case, turned Kryss down (high consistency); (e) there were four other people on the promotion committee, two of whom were female; (f) there were approximately 40 people in the employee's branch of the company. Several other facts were also developed in the scenario (e.g., a discussion of recent Wrings), but the above represent the items focused on for the priming manipulation. Items b, c, and d constitute the attribution-relevant information for subsequent priming, and items a, e, and f represented the set of control or attribution-irrelevant items for priming.
Procedure
Subjects arrived in groups of three or four and were randomly assigned to one of four experimental cubicles. Each subject was seated at a table facing a TV monitor and a seven-button response panel and was instructed to put on a set of headphones. All instructions and questions were read over the headphones to subjects and were simultaneously presented in written form on the TV monitor.
The initial instructions informed subjects that they would be observing an interview between an employee and his supervisor and that they would be asked a few questions about the interview later. After observing the interview, subjects were informed that (a) questions would be presented on the screen along with a 7-point alternative response scale; (b) the question would be simultaneously read to the subject; (c) following each question there would be 30 sec for them to respond before the next question appeared; and (d) after determining their answer they should press one of the seven keys indicating their response. At no point were subjects told that we were monitoring the latency of their responses.
Priming manipulation. Following these instructions, each subject responded to four questions. The first three questions for the control conditions were as follows: (a) How long has the employee worked for the company? (from 1 = 3 months to 7 = 24 months, in 3-month intervals); (b) How many females are on the promotion committee? (numbered from 1 to 7); and (c) How many people are in the employee's branch of the company? (from 1 = 10 to 7 = 70, in intervals of 10). The first three questions for the attribution-relevant conditions were as follows: (a) How many other people, besides Bob Kryss, has the employee turned down for promotion? (b) On how many other occasions has the employee turned down Kryss for promotion? (c) How many other members of the promotion committee turned Kryss down? These three questions were placed on a scale with endpoints labeled none (1) and all (7) and the midpoint labeled about half. Responses to these three questions are directly related to distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus, respectively, when considering the employee as the actor (person) and turning down Bob Kryss' promotion bid as the action. Each priming question remained on the TV screen for 30 sec.
Dependent measures. Following the priming questions, subjects were asked one of the following three questions: (a) To what extent do you believe that the employee's decision not to promote Bob Kryss was due to some characteristic of Bob Kryss? (b) To what extent do you believe that the employee's decision not to promote Bob Kryss was due to something about the employee's personal characteristics? (c) To what extent do you believe that the employee's decision not to promote Bob Kryss was due to something about the particular circumstances at the time Kryss was evaluated? Each question was on a scale from 1 (labeled not at all) to 7 (completely), with the midpoint labeled somewhat. These questions refer to stimulus, person, and circumstance attribution types, respectively. Response latencies for the attribution measures were recorded; the maximum response latency allowed was 30 sec.
Results and Discussion
The average scale responses to the consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness priming questions were 6.11, 6.47, and 6.64, respectively. Perfect recall on these three questions would have produced scores of 7.0 on the 7-point scale for each question. Thus, subjects' memory for the attribution-relevant information in the scenario was reasonably good.
Subjects' attributions and response latencies were analyzed by separate 2 (attribution-relevant priming, attribution-irrelevant priming) X 3 (type of attribution, i.e., person, stimulus, or circumstance) between-subjects unweighted-means analyses of variance. For the attribution measures, there was a significant main effect for type of attribution, F(2, 87) = 7.16, p < .001, but no effect for priming and no interaction. A Newman-Keuls test revealed that the main effect for type of attribution was due to significantly (p < .05) lower attributions to the person than to either the stimulus or the circumstance (Ms = 4.15, 5.48, and 6.83, respectively).
The analysis on response latencies revealed a significant main effect for priming, F(l, 87) = 99.11, p < .001, but no effect for type of attribution and no interaction. The mean response latency for subjects in the attribution-relevant priming conditions was 3.94 sec, whereas the mean response latency for attribution-irrelevant priming subjects was 11.66 sec. No subjects failed to respond within the 30-sec period.
Among the most significant aspects of these results is the fact that subjects' scaled attributions were unaffected by the priming manipulation. This fact suggests that the control subjects, who were not directly led to consider Kelley's three factors of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness, were considering the same factors as the subjects who were primed with the three factors. Alternatively, it could be argued that none of the subjects were making use of Kelley's three factors, thereby leading to similar attribution responses for all subjects irrespective of priming. This latter interpretation, however, is contravened by the fact that attribution-relevant priming subjects made their attributions almost three times faster than did the attribution-irrelevant priming subjects. Simultaneous consideration of the scaled attributions and attribution response latencies leads us to postulate that consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness were central to the causal attribution process of our observers.
An alternate way to view our results is to suggest that the attribution-relevant priming actually instigated the attribution process rather than facilitated access to the relevant information. That is, by the time the attribution question was posed, attribution-relevant primed subjects may already have engaged in the attribution process and have been, on the average, closer to an answer than were the control subjects. We have neither the method for nor the interest in eliminating this possibility. Although this interpretation of the process is different from ours at one level, it is totally congruent with our view that accessing consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness facilitates the attribution process.
Experiment 2
One question regarding the results of Experiment 1 is whether the attribution-relevant priming facilitated the attribution process or whether the control condition slowed down the attribution process. This is a difficult issue because a control group that is not primed with any information may cause long response latencies for a totally irrelevant reason, namely, lack of experience or practice with answering questions on the response panel. Nevertheless, Experiment 2 addresses this as well as several other questions by priming only one of the three factors (either consensus, consistency, or distinctiveness). To the extent that the priming of one factor produces longer response latencies on the average than when all three factors are primed, then it would indicate that the greater the cognitive access to Kelley's three factors, the more the attribution process is facilitated.
Another purpose of Experiment 2 was to explore the specific schematic representation of Kelley's (1967 Kelley's ( , 1973 covariance model that is presented in Table 1 (reprinted from Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975, Table 1 , p. 607). Orvis et al. found that the unique elements of each information pattern (e.g., high consensus is unique to the stimulus attribution pattern) yielded attributions as correspondent with the complete pattern as did presentations of the complete pattern. On the basis of these results, Orvis et al. suggested that elements unique to a pattern may actually facilitate attributions consistent with the overall pattern because they do not intro-duce competing attributional interpretations of the effect. This analysis suggests that there will be one element in each information pattern that will be more diagnostic of a particular attribution than will be the other two elements. In terms of Table 1 , therefore, high consensus, relative to high distinctiveness or high consistency, should facilitate stimulus attribution. The rationale for this is that high consensus is unique to the stimulus pattern, whereas high distinctiveness and high consistency are not. Therefore, as high consensus alone clearly implicates the stimulus as a causal influence, so do high distinctiveness and high consistency implicate circumstance and person causes, respectively. A similar logic is applicable to the person and circumstance patterns. Orvis et al.'s (1975) uniqueness criterion suggests that the priming of unique elements of an information array should facilitate the corresponding attribution, whereas the priming of nonunique elements will not. Although Orvis et al.'s attribution results are consistent with this rationale, their results do not completely address the question of whether unique elements facilitated, whereas nonunique elements failed to facilitate, the attribution process. The use of response latencies is one means of assessing this differential facilitation hypothesis.
Assuming that Table 1 reflects a valid schematic representation of attribution, then the following derivation can be made: When considering the role of the stimulus in causal attribution, the single piece of information most diagnostic of the stimulus role would be consensus. The rationale for this is that if consensus is high it implies a causal role for the stimulus, and if consensus is low it implies that the stimulus had little or no causal role in the action. However, neither distinctiveness information nor consistency information have as much diagnostic value for stimulus attributions. That is, whereas low distinctiveness (or low consistency) clearly implies that the stimulus played little or no role, high distinctiveness could support either a circumstance or a stimulus attribution and high consistency could support either a person or a stimulus attribution. This same logic leads us to postulate that when considering the role of the person in causal attribution, distinctiveness information is the single most diagnostic piece of information, and when considering the role of circumstance in causal attribution, consistency is the single most diagnostic piece of information. Decision-time predictions. The foregoing derivation led us to the following hypotheses, (a) Because consensus is the most diagnostic factor for stimulus attributions, priming of consensus would reduce decision time for stimulus attributions more than would priming of either of the other factors, (b) Because distinctiveness is the most diagnostic factor for person attributions, priming distinctiveness would reduce decision time for person attributions more than would priming the other two factors, (c) Because consistency is the most diagnostic factor for circumstance attributions, priming consistency would reduce circumstance attribution decision times more than would priming the other two factors. These hypotheses, of course, rely at least in part on the validity of Table 1 as a representation of the schematic process of attributions.
Scaled attribution predictions. Recent evidence suggests that subjective estimates of frequency and probability are influenced by the cognitive accessibility of the information (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) . We adopted such a notion to generate predictions regarding how the separate priming of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness (cf. Experiment 1, in which all three are primed for a given subject) might affect the scaled attributions of our observers. We reasoned that if the consideration of a single factor (e.g., high consensus) would lead to a different attribution than would consideration of one of the other factors (e.g., low distinctiveness), then the factor that was most accessible would determine which attribution would dominate (see Table 1 ). Because the scenario used in Experiment 1 involved high consensus, low distinctiveness, and high consistency, we felt that it was suitable for testing the above hypothesis in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, wherein we primed only one of the three factors for each subject, we expected that (a) person attributions would be higher when either high consistency or low distinctiveness were primed than when high consensus was primed and (b) stimulus attributions would be higher when either high consensus or high consistency were primed than when low distinctiveness was primed.
It is less clear what will happen with circumstance attributions. A direct derivation from Table 1 suggests that circumstance attributions will be equally affected by each of the three primes, since each prime implies a low circumstance attribution. However, it is here that we must note a weakness in the schematic representation shown in Table 1 . Specifically, it is not at all clear that either high consensus or low distinctiveness necessarily implies a low circumstance attribution. In our operationalization of high consensus, for example, it is reasonable for the observer to assume that all members of the promotion committee made their decisions about Bob Kryss simultaneously and under the same circumstance. Thus, circumstance is necessarily not ruled out as an explanation for Bob Kryss' failure to be promoted. Similarly, in our operationalization of low distinctiveness, it is reasonable for the observer to assume that the employee made all of his promotion decisions at one time and, hence, that the decisions were all made within the same circumstance. Note, however, that high consistency (over time) unambiguously implies the implausibility of a circumstance attribution. We intentionally operationali/ed high consensus and low distinctiveness in this manner to avoid directly confounding consensus and distinctiveness with temporal consistency. Using this derivation, it would be expected that circumstance attribution would be lessened more by priming high consistency (over time) than by priming either low distinctiveness or high consensus.
Method Subjects and Design
One hundred thirty-seven persons (60 males, 77 females) participated in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine conditions in a 3 (priming of information directly related to consensus, consistency, or distinctiveness) X 3 (attribution to person, stimulus, or circumstance) between-subjects factorial design.
Apparatus, Scenario, and Procedure
The apparatus, scenario, and procedure (including instructions) were identical to those described in Experiment 1.
Priming Manipulation and Dependent Measures
Following the scenario, subjects responded to one of the three priming questions, represented by Questions a, b, and c in the attribution-relevant priming conditions of Experiment 1 (see Procedure, Priming manipulation). Thus, subjects were primed with information directly related to either consensus, consistency, or distinctiveness, rather than all three. The dependent measures were the same as in Experiment 1, again measured between subjects.
Results and Discussion
Separate 3 (priming of consensus, consistency, or distinctiveness information) X 3 (person, stimulus, or circumstance attribution types) between-subjects unweighted-means analyses of variance were conducted on the scale responses and response latencies. Table  2 presents the means for both of these analyses.
Response Latencies
The analysis of response latencies revealed significant main effects of both the type of prime, F(2, 128) = 4.23, p < .02, and the type of attribution factors, F(2, 128) = 4.96, p < .008, as well as a significant Prime X Attribution interaction, F(4, 128) = 7.74, p < .001. Mean response latencies are displayed in the top panel of Table 2 . A Newman-Keuls analysis revealed that, as expected, response latencies for person attributions were significantly lower when distinctiveness was primed than when either consensus or consistency was primed, the latter two not being significantly different. Finally, circumstance attributions were made quickest when either consistency or distinctiveness was primed than when consensus was primed, although these were not significantly different from one another.
Although the response latency data are for the most part consistent with our derivations, the fact that priming consistency did not produce a significant decrease in decision times for the circumstance attribution is discrepant from our expectations. This discrepancy suggests that the uniqueness criterion on which we based our predictions may not be the only factor that determines the facilitory effect of priming. Note that unlike low distinctiveness and high consensus, high consistency implies the absence rather than the presence of its unique element (i.e., circumstance). Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) have shown that information implying the presence of something is more facilitative of decisions than is information implying the absence of something. Thus, although consistency is most related to circumstance attribution (according to the uniqueness derivation), high consistency implies the absence of circumstance as a plausible cause. Thus, the priming of high rather than low consistency may have inhibited the facilitative effect predicted by the accessibility hypothesis.
Scale Responses
The analysis of attribution scale responses also yielded a significant main effect for type of prime, F(2, 128) = S.10, p < .007; type of attribution, F(2, 128) -9.8S, p< .001; and a Prime X Attribution interaction, F(4, 128) = 33.4, p < .001. Mean attribution scale responses are displayed in the lower panel of Table 2 . A Newman-Keuls analysis revealed that circumstance attributions were lower when high consistency information was primed than when either high consensus or low distinctiveness was primed. This is con- 
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Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants in each condition. Means with no common subscript differ significantly (p < .05, by Newman-Keuls).
sistent with our earlier suggestion that the schematic representation of circumstance attributions in Table 1 is not necessarily correct. Specifically, low distinctiveness and high consensus do not as strongly imply the implausibility of circumstance attributions as does high consistency. We suspect that this is especially true when the high consensus and low distinctiveness information could have occurred in a single setting (i.e., a given circumstance). A behavior that is consistent over time, however, clearly does not occur under the same circumstances.
The Newman-Keuls analysis also revealed that person attributions were the highest when either high consistency or low distinctiveness information was primed and stimulus attributions were the highest when the high consensus information was primed. This latter effect is slightly discrepant from our expectations. We had expected that stimulus attribution would be highest when either high consensus or high consistency information was primed. However, this finding is in line with Orvis et al.'s (197S) and McArthur's (1972) empirical findings. Orvis et al. and McArthur found that observers tend to attribute behavioral consistency more to the person than to the stimulus. Apparently, observers prefer to focus on the fact that the action is consistent for the actor across occasions, without giving equal consideration to the fact that the stimulus (Bob Kryss) was an equally common element across occasions. Orvis et al. suggested that observers typically make a plausible assumption that circumstances occasionally make consistency in action toward a stimulus rather difficult and, "thus, conditions supplying high consistency information should be more strongly related to the person pattern than to the stimulus pattern" (Orvis et al., 1975, p. 613) .
Whatever the merit of Orvis et al.'s interpretation, our independent replication of this effect using a totally different paradigm suggests that the effect is reliable and worthy of future consideration. The cognitive processes involved in observers' tendencies to link high consistency with person rather than stimulus in conjunction with observers' tendencies to assume high behavioral consistency may help account for dispositional biases in attribution (cf. Jones, 1979; Miller, 1976; Pryor & Kriss, 1977; Ross, 1977) .
General Discussion
A consideration of the studies reported in this article leads us to speculate that Kelley's (1967 Kelley's ( , 1973 analysis may represent a reasonable model of how an observer derives stimulus, person, and circumstance attributions. Specifically, the data indicate that increasing the observers' cognitive accessibility to consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness produces attributional outcomes more quickly than does increasing observers' cognitive access to other information. 1 We believe that these results should be interpreted in terms of a process wherein the priming of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness facilitated the attribution process.
As noted earlier, an alternative way in which the results of Experiment 1 might be interpreted is to argue that the attributionrelevant priming did not facilitate the attribution process; rather, the control questions slowed down the attribution process. If this is true, however, then it should be expected that the priming of all three attribution-relevant factors should be no more facilitative of response latencies than the priming of only one attribution-relevant factor. This is testable by comparing the average response latency of the attribution-relevant prime conditions of Experiment 1 with the average response latency in Experiment 2.-Such a comparison fails, of course, to take into account any practice effects (i.e., potential for benefit of having subjects more experienced at the apparatus) favoring Experiment 1. Thus, we also compared the attribution-irrelevant prime group of Experiment 1 to the average response latency in Experiment 2. Note that the respective mean response latencies of the irrelevant-prime subjects, relevant-prime subjects, and Experiment 2 subjects were 11.66 sec, 3.94 sec, and 8.0S sec, F(2, 227) = 45.25, p < .0001. All three of these means are significantly different from one another. Thus, priming all three of the attribution-relevant factors was more facilitative than priming only one attribution-relevant factor, which in turn was more facilitative than priming the irrelevant factors. Note that there is no apparent relationship between the order of these means and a practice effect interpretation. Instead, it appears that the extent to which cognitive access to consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness is increased determines the speed of the attribution process.
The decision-time results lend construct validity to Kelley's process model beyond traditional output measures, that is, scaled attributions (cf. Taylor, 1976) . The generality of this support should be assessed, however, with a wider sample of the eight basic patterns and with variations of presentation order. More research will also be needed to 1 It might be argued that the priming manipulation simply led subjects to consider the intent of the experimenter's manipulation and to respond accordingly. Such an argument, nevertheless, does not appreciably modify our conclusions, since it necessarily assumes that the naive observer was able to quickly generate hypotheses in line with Kelley's model.
-Because Experiments 1 and 2 were run simultaneously with random assignment to groups and studies, comparisons between response latencies in the two studies are methodologically legitimate. determine whether increasing cognitive access to consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness also reduces response latencies for more specific attributions such as traits (e.g., Wells & Harvey, 1977) , attitudes (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967) , moral evaluations (e.g., Kelley, 1971) , freedom (Harvey, 1976) , and so on. In addition, more research will be needed to determine whether increasing cognitive access to other plausible mediators of attribution (e.g., desirability a la Jones & Davis, 1965) reduces decision times for subsequent attributions.
The data in Experiment 2 are also consistent with a specific notion of when consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information may not be equal contributors to the attribution process. Specifically, the data support a process wherein consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information may have different weighting values that are at least partly determined by their relative accessibility. Similar results have been obtained in studies that find recency effects by varying the presentation order of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness (see Ruble & Feldman, 1976) . These recency effects may be at least partly mediated by accessibility. Similarly, information salience may affect the differential accessibility of consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness information, which in turn may affect the relative impact of that information in the attribution process (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1978) . Pryor and Kriss (1977) , for example, manipulated consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information and whether the syntactic subject of the sentence was the actual subject or object of the sentence. Their results indicate that the syntactic subject of the sentence was both more salient and resulted in higher causal attributions than the syntactic object.
Our data show that enhanced cognitive accessibility to the factors that Kelley (1967 Kelley ( , 1973 suggested mediated causal attributions does appear to speed up the attribution process. However, there are times when direct access to these factors is not available. This raises the issues of whether and how individuals infer the values of consistency, consensus, or distinctiveness information. For example, do people rely on this information only when it is explicitly provided-or will they actively seek these values in the case in which they are unavailable? If the information values are actively sought, on what types of observations are estimates of the values made? So far, only the consensus variable has been addressed in this manner, and the results suggest that inferred consensus may be based in part on beliefs about one's own actions (see Ross, 1977, pp. 187-193) . Future research should assess, for example, whether inferences regarding behavioral consistency are actually based on estimates of the cross-situational invariance of behavior or are based on the deduction of this type of consistency from some other type of inference (e.g., traits).
